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When portrait photographer Patrick Cariou saw that his original photos of Jamaican
Rastafarians had been used by renowned appropriation artist Richard Prince in a collage series
called “Canal Zone”—sales of which grossed Prince close to $11 million—Cariou sued for
copyright infringement in the Southern District of New York. The decision was held in Cariou’s
favor and was blasted by commentators as “frightening,” “[k]afkaesque,” and “untenable.”
Much of that criticism wasn’t aimed at the court’s rejection of appropriation as fair use, but
rather at its authorized remedy: to “deliver up for impounding, destruction, or other
disposition, as Plaintiff determines,” all unsold works from the “Canal Zone” series. The legal
status of appropriation art in the Second Circuit has long been a matter of some ambiguity.
The Second Circuit subsequently reversed and remanded the majority decision, and in the
process unleashed a revised, but largely formless fair use standard: whether the reasonable
observer can detect new meaning in the work in question. The public furor surrounding the
district court’s remedy may partially explain why the Second Circuit took special pains to
clarify that the court-ordered destruction of Richard Prince’s art would be “improper and
against the public interest.” But the truth of that statement isn’t exactly self-evident.
The aftermath of the Prince case demonstrates how court-ordered destruction might instead
advance the public interest by serving as a creative catalyst and encouraging even more
copyright infringement or, depending on the eye of the reasonable observer, more art. The
Southern District’s order in Prince encouraged the production and distribution of physical and
digital copies of Prince’s work, both by members of artistic communities in protest over what
they perceived to be a culturally illiterate judiciary and by the legal community in preparation
for counsel to art world clients on the outer limits of fair use. It also inspired other artists to
build on Prince’s appropriation and create new art in both physical and digital media.
During depositions, Prince had complained that prior to Cariou’s suit “not one review, in any
magazine” had been written about “Canal Zone.” After the district court order, however,
publicity of “Canal Zone” exploded. Art websites posted jpegs of Prince’s paintings and
Cariou’s photos side-by-side, usually accompanying editorials in favor of one of the
artists. Newspapers ran stories of the Prince verdict, including images of the forbidden
paintings condemned to destruction. An artist released a book consisting of the parties’ trial
submissions, including reproductions of the entire “Canal Zone” series, and offered it for sale
on Amazon.com for $17.99. An Italian art school created two open-source Tumblrs, titled
“After Prince” and “After Cariou,” displaying animated GIFs based on Cariou’s and Prince’s
works, urging contributors to visit the artists’ websites, download an image, animate it, and

submit it for automatic inclusion. Hundreds of submissions followed. Meanwhile, lawyers and
law students previously unfamiliar with either Prince’s or Cariou’s works scrutinized the elusive
line between fair use and infringement. In short, the order to destroy the “Canal Zone”
paintings inspired their even wider dissemination to an audience who had shown little interest
in them beforehand.
Given Prince’s particular fame as a leading exponent of the appropriation art movement, it is
possible that a similarly perverse outcome would not take place in the case of a lesser-known
artist. After all, much of the attention given to the suit no doubt stemmed from the fact that a
relatively unknown photographer had taken on a wildly successful contemporary artist whose
name would be instantly recognizable to media consumers. On the other hand, it is also
plausible that the root of public attention came not from the artists involved, but instead from
the use of a remedy so draconian as to provoke comparisons by the Second Circuit panel with
the Huns and the Taliban. In that sense, even lesser-known artists could benefit from the
exponentially increased audience associated with an order of destruction. Destruction, by
definition, also rarifies the destroyed work or the series it comes from; it means that one less
copy or one less piece of the series exists. That restricted supply is in turn likely to increase
both demand for and market value of whatever remnants of the work or series remain. That’s
an odd result for a copyright system whose remedies are intended to cure economic injuries.
Perhaps Cariou’s true motivation in seeking injunctive relief was to simply erase from
existence a work that he personally disliked, which was made by an artist who had offended
him. In interviews after the trial, Cariou accused Prince of exhibiting “arrogance, an
overwhelming sense of power, and plain laziness,” in the creation of “a racist piece of art” and
openly pondered the possibility of destruction according to his whim: “[d]estroying art if you
don’t like it, that’s something you have to think extremely deeply about. We’ll see.”
Such an aim, of course, falls outside of copyright’s presumably economic-based incentive scheme.
But more to the point, court-ordered destruction misses the mark. The litigation and
accompanying order in Prince fueled even wider dissemination of reproductions of “Canal Zone.”
In fact, the destruction order seemed to grant Prince’s paintings a perverse prominence. In the art
community, Prince’s works were martyrized as victims of an unjust copyright regime. The art
students who designed the “After Prince” and “After Cariou” Tumblrs in response to the
destruction order expressed a direct and certain view of the law: upon placing a mouse cursor on
either of the websites, the words “FUCK COPYRIGHT,” in capital letters and bold, purple font, circle
perpetually. Meanwhile, in the legal community, the images have become the marker of fair use’s
ephemeral boundaries, likely to be reproduced and redistributed in inter-office memos, law
reviews, and case reporters. The increased visibility took place even without actual destruction: it
was the order’s mere threat alone that motivated the media’s coverage. After being remanded by
the Second Circuit, whatever legal disposition results for the Prince works, “Canal Zone” images
are sure to survive as signifiers of the thinnest of lines separating infringement from fair use, one
that was responsible for remaking the Second Circuit’s formulation of the doctrine itself.

In its zeal to save the Prince paintings from physical destruction above all else, the Second Circuit
panel failed to adequately examine the actual effects of court-ordered destruction. It also
neglected an opportunity to rationally defend against destruction of works in future fair use cases.
Instead, it held in the most minimal of fashions that the destruction of Prince’s artwork alone
would be against the public interest. Emerging artists, whose works have yet to collect the
accolades and vigorous defenders Prince enjoys, remain vulnerable to a fair use standard that,
more than ever, depends on the eye of the beholding judge. But artists and their defenders
should take note: if the trajectory of the Prince case is a reliable indication of future trends, courtordered destruction of art may actually be a surprisingly effective way to ensure its survival.

For a more in-depth discussion of the interaction between court-ordered destruction of art and
artistic production, see “The Destructive Impulse of Fair Use after Cariou v. Prince,” forthcoming
in the DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law.

